These are briefly explained below, though no short summary does adequate justice to Havel’s insightful and well-written essay. (See Readings for links to free versions.)
1. Post-totalitarianism
By post-totalitarianism Havel meant a new form of totalitarianism that has emerged in the modern era. If differs from “classical dictatorship” in several respects. First, whereas classical dictatorships are unique, historical aberrations — often based on a cult of personality — post-totalitarianism is rooted in the history of ideas (e.g., draped in the mantle of 19th century socialist theories and Enlightenment political liberalism);
Second, as a government system, post-totalitarianism outlives changes in political leaders and ruling parties:
a post-totalitarian system, after all, is not the manifestation of a particular political line followed by a particular government. It is something radically different: it is a complex, profound, and long-term violation of society, or rather the self-violation of society. To oppose it merely by establishing a different political line and then striving for a change in government would not only be unrealistic, it would be utterly inadequate, for it would never come near to touching the root of the matter.
Third, whereas classical dictatorships use direct force to oppress and control the masses, post-totalitarianism uses indirect methods (see ‘Conformity’ below).
Fourth, means of overturning classical dictatorships, including revolution and elections, are ineffective here.
Even if revolt were possible, however, it would remain the solitary gesture of a few isolated individuals and they would be opposed not only by a gigantic apparatus of national (and supranational) power, but also by the very society in whose name they were mounting their revolt in the first place. (This, by the way, is another reason why the regime and its propaganda have been ascribing terroristic aims to the “dissident” movements and accusing them of illegal and conspiratorial methods.)
2. Bureaucracy
Post-totalitarianism takes the form of an expansive and omnipotent bureaucracy. It begins with the government itself, but enlarges to assimilate business, news and communication media, education, and cultural institutions. Fundamentally amoral and unprincipled, its main aim is to preserve itself and to expand. Any threat to its power is met with savage (and inevitably effective) opposition.
3. Ideology
Havel’s insights about the role of ideology in post-totalitarianism are one of the essay’s greatest contributions. Ideology supplies two main functions in a post-totalitarian system: excusatory and administrative.
Excusatory function. First, it’s the means by which the bureaucracy legitimizes itself:
Ideology is a specious way of relating to the world. It offers human beings the illusion of an identity, of dignity, and of morality while making it easier for them to part with these.
Ideology, [creates] a bridge of excuses between the system and the individual … a world of appearances trying to pass for reality.
The primary excusatory function of ideology, therefore, is to provide people, both as victims and pillars of the post-totalitarian system, with the illusion that the system is in harmony with the human order and the order of the universe.
It enables people to deceive their conscience and conceal their true position and their inglorious modus vivendi.
It supplies a veil behind which human beings can hide their own fallen existence, their trivialization.
Administrative function. Second, ideology supplies the means by which a totalitarian system organizes and communicates with itself.
Ideology plays a central role in the complex machinery of the post-totalitarian system. It supplies indirect instruments of manipulation which ensure in countless ways the integrity of the regime, leaving nothing to chance.
Ideology offers a fundamental world view, with which to interpret every event, activity and entity in the world of human affairs. It supplies virtually a “metaphysical order” that “guarantees the inner coherence of the totalitarian power structure,” and “integrates its communication system and makes possible the internal exchange and transfer of information and instructions.”
In order for post-totalitarian ideology to operate effectively, it must reign in every area of society. No threat to it, and no opposing alternative ideology, can be permitted to emerge. Unchallenged, the ideology becomes increasingly removed from reality.
As the interpretation of reality by the power structure, ideology is always subordinated ultimately to the interests of the structure. Therefore, it has a natural tendency to disengage itself from reality, to create a world of appearances, to become ritual. In societies where there is public competition for power and therefore public control of that power, there also exists quite naturally public control of the way that power legitimates itself ideologically. [Usually] there are always certain correctives that effectively prevent ideology from abandoning reality altogether. Under [post-totalitarianism], however, these correctives disappear, and thus there is nothing to prevent ideology from becoming more and more removed from reality, gradually turning into … a world of appearances, a mere ritual, a formalized language deprived of semantic contact with reality and transformed into a system of ritual signs that replace reality with pseudo-reality.
Yet, as we have seen, ideology becomes at the same time an increasingly important component of power, a pillar providing it with both excusatory legitimacy and an inner coherence. As this aspect grows in importance, and as it gradually loses touch with reality, it acquires a peculiar but very real strength. It becomes reality itself, albeit a reality altogether self-contained, one that on certain levels (chiefly inside the power structure) may have even greater weight than reality as such. Increasingly, the virtuosity of the ritual becomes more important than the reality hidden behind it. The significance of phenomena no longer derives from the phenomena themselves, but from their locus as concepts in the ideological context. Reality does not shape theory, but rather the reverse.
Because the regime is captive to its own lies, it must falsify everything. It falsifies the past. It falsifies the present, and it falsifies the future. It falsifies statistics. It pretends not to possess an omnipotent and unprincipled police apparatus. It pretends to respect human rights. It pretends to persecute no one. It pretends to fear nothing. It pretends to pretend nothing.
4. Conformity
Yet, Havel claims, the post-totalitarian system and its tissue of lies require the tacit or active endorsement of the masses.
Individuals need not believe all these mystifications, but they must behave as though they did, or they must at least tolerate them in silence, or get along well with those who work with them. For this reason, however, they must live within a lie. They need not accept the lie. It is enough for them to have accepted their life with it and in it.
For by this very fact, individuals confirm the system, fulfill the system, make the system, are the system…
by accepting the prescribed ritual, by accepting appearances as reality, by accepting the given rules of the game. In doing so, however, he has himself become a player in the game, thus making it possible for the game to go on, for it to exist in the first place
the moment that excuse is accepted, it constitutes power inwardly
everyone in his own way is both a victim and a supporter of the system. What we understand by the system is not, therefore, a social order imposed by one group upon another, but rather something which permeates the entire society and is a factor in shaping it.
The American post-totalitarian system is especially insidious in its use of economic and other incentives to gain the support of the population and their acceptance of self-oppression.
Even progressive liberals are heavily invested in the status quo (and even literally so, as they see their retirement portfolios grow while the Dow Jones Industrial Average increases year after year, regardless of the injustices Wall Street perpetrates to ensure profits. The public is addicted wholesale to social media like Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, which collude with the security state. A large proportion of jobs exist within oppressive corporations and government institutions.
5. Solutions
If the essence of post-totalitarianism is construction of a false reality, and if the people themselves maintain the system by living a lie within it, then, Havel argues, the only real solution is for people to begin again living in the truth.
A genuine, profound, and lasting change for the better — as I shall attempt to show — can no longer result from the victory (were such a victory possible) of any particular traditional political conception, which can ultimately be only external, that is, a structural or systemic conception. More than ever before, such a change will have to derive from human existence, from the fundamental reconstitution of the position of people in the world, their relationships to themselves and to each other, and to the universe. If a better economic and political model is to be created, then perhaps more than ever before it must derive from profound existential and moral changes in society. This is not something that can be designed and introduced like a new car. If it is to be more than just a new variation of the old degeneration, it must above all be an expression of life in the process of transforming itself. A better system will not automatically ensure a better life. In fact, the opposite is true: only by creating a better life can a better system be developed.
There is an emphasis on the word “living” here. Havel does not mean paying lip service to the truth, or raging against lies. Living in the truth is an existential solution that occurs first at the individual level, and then at a cultural level. Words, manifestos, articles and books are not enough. The revolution is an accumulation of individual shifts in personal consciousness, to experiential anamnesis of the True, the Beautiful and the Good.
Part of the solution, Havel argues, is dissent — but (and this is very important) only certain forms of dissent. Many forms of dissent are ineffective and counter-productive.
An essential part of the “dissident” attitude is that it comes out of the reality of the human here and now. It places more importance on often repeated and consistent concrete action — even though it may be inadequate and though it may ease only insignificantly the suffering of a single insignificant citizen — than it does in some abstract fundamental solution in an uncertain future.
Another form of living in the truth is legal challenges. Legal challenges are, so to speak, an Achilles’ heel of the post-totalitarian system, because it needs to legitimize itself in laws.
In other words, is the legalistic approach at all compatible with the principle of living within the truth? This question can only be answered by first looking at the wider implications of how the legal code functions in the post-totalitarian system. In a classical dictatorship, to a far greater extent than in the post-totalitarian system, the will of the ruler is carried out directly, in an unregulated fashion. A dictatorship has no reason to hide its foundations, nor to conceal the real workings of power, and therefore it need not encumber itself to any great extent with a legal code. The post-totalitarian system, on the other hand, is utterly obsessed with the need to bind everything in a single order: life in such a state is thoroughly permeated by a dense network of regulations, proclamations, directives, norms, orders, and rules. (It is not called a bureaucratic system without good reason.)
Like ideology, the legal code functions as an excuse. It wraps the base exercise of power in the noble apparel of the letter of the law; it creates the pleasing illusion that justice is done, society protected, and the exercise of power objectively regulated.
Because the system cannot do without the law, because it is hopelessly tied down by the necessity of pretending the laws are observed, it is compelled to react in some way to such appeals. Demanding that the laws be upheld is thus an act of living within the truth that threatens the whole mendacious structure at its point of maximum mendacity.
They have no other choice: because they cannot discard the rules of their own game, they can only attend more carefully to those rules. Not to react to challenges means to undermine their own excuse and lose control of their mutual communications system.
But more than anything else Havel understands living in the truth as something apolitical. The root problem is that we are a false society composed of false selves. We must concentrate on creating a new, authentic culture, one person at a time.
Above all, any existential revolution should provide hope of a moral reconstitution of society, which means a radical renewal of the relationship of human beings to what I have called the “human order,” which no political order can replace. A new experience of being, a renewed rootedness in the universe, a newly grasped sense of higher responsibility, a new-found inner relationship to other people and to the human community — these factors clearly indicate the direction in which we must go.
In other words, the issue is the rehabilitation of values like trust, openness, responsibility, solidarity, love.
In view of this, how ironic it is that since Havel’s time a different paradigm of regime change has prevailed in Eastern Europe. Instead of living in the truth, the US (via the CIA), globalized corporations, and dubiously-aligned NGOs have used covert activities and mass propaganda to not only to impose changes of government, but to assassinate truth.
Comparison with Sorokin
Havel’s ideas here invite comparison with those of Pitirim Sorokin, who also called for a moral reconstruction of humanity in responses to the crises of modern culture. While their views are similar, Sorokin (armed with his massive historical studies of human culture) arguably delved more deeply into what such a reconstruction would look like, and how it might be accomplished. For one thing, he was much more aware of the role of traditional spirituality in effecting such changes. He also placed great emphasis on the experience of Love (agape) as a central positive cultural value. Finally, Sorokin understood that ultimately solutions must come from higher sources of inspiration — the supraconscious. Without strong or definite religious convictions, Havel — for all his excellencies — could only grope in the dark about matters of spirituality. He agreed that rationalism itself could supply no answers, but could only discuss transcendence in vague terms (e.g. Havel, 1993). More than once Havel quoted the words of Heidegger, to the effect that in the crises of modernity “Only a God can save us now.” Whereas Havel could leave this as no more than a poetic expression, Sorokin could carry it to is logical conclusion: “Fortunately, there is a God, to whom we should turn.”
Note: Quotations have been edited and rearranged in places; please compare with original source before excerpting anything.
Readings
Havel, Václav. The power of the powerless. Paul Wilson, tr. In: John Keane (ed.), The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central Eastern Europe, M. E. Sharpe, 1985. Orig. publ. in International Journal of Politics, vol. 15, no. 3/4, 1985, pp. 23–96. [pdf version] [plain text version]
Havel, Václav. The need for transcendence in the postmodern world. The Futurist, July−August 1995. Speech delivered in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, July 4, 1994.
Sorokin, Pitirim. The Reconstruction of Humanity. Boston: Beacon Press, 1948.
Sorokin, Pitirim A. The Ways and Power of Love: Types, Factors, and Techniques of Moral Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954; repr. Templeton Foundation, 2002. [ebook]
Related posts
You must be logged in to post a comment.